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The evolutionary origin of selfhood 
in normative emotions
1.     Introduction: The Problem of Normativity
Normativity is a fundamental feature of selfhood.1 In the Modern, 
Enlightenment tradition, being a self is having the capacity to be autonomous, 
that is, to be responsible for one's own actions and beliefs. To be a self, an 
organism must be capable of freely following cognitive, behavioural and 
linguistic norms. It must be able to justify its positions by giving reasons to 
others -- and to itself. These capacities are contrasted not only with mechanical
causation in the physical world, but with the heteronomous status of slaves, of 
individuals controlled by hypnosis or evil neurosurgeons, or of those 
manipulated by propaganda or advertising. Thoughts and actions are only mine
in so far as I, as an independent individual, take responsibility for them. Only 
by such deliberative and conscious activity can I take ownership of them. 
Descartes' rejection of received opinion and Kant's insistence that a Subject 
must be self-regulating exemplify this Modern tradition. 
This tradition sets up a dichotomy between reason and emotion by 
relegating emotion to causal bodily processes and so placing it on the side of 
heteronomy. If the self is identified with a higher, perhaps spiritual, soul and 
emotions are understood as lowly, bodily processes, then the capacity to freely
follow norms seems to require that one must escape from emotionality if one is
to be a rational, autonomous self. 
Evolution presents a challenge to this dualist tradition. Normative selves 
do not spring up fully grown, like Athena from the head of Zeus, but originate 
in a gradual evolutionary process. Once, say six millions years ago, there were 
no rational, responsible selves.2 Now there are. How could we have got here 
from there? The possibility of purely natural biological processes governed by 
causal laws giving rise to norms, and to creatures that are bound by them, is 
hard to imagine. Yet it is clear that such a transition actually occurred. 
This paper aims to make this transition easier to imagine. I will offer a just-
so story that proposes a gradual evolution of norm-governed hominins. I 
hypothesize the development of "proto-selves" intermediate between non-
human primates and modern autonomous selves equipped with language and 
the capacity to give reasons. Even prior to the arrival of language, early 
hominins found ways to unify into groups based on the cumulative inheritance 
of skills from generation to generation. Such groups could only have been 
maintained by individuals cooperating and performing their own distinctive 
roles within the community. Only if each proto-self had been bound by the 
social norms of the group would this have been possible. At this pre-linguistic 
stage these norms could not have been based on explicit rules, so I'm 
conjecturing an intermediate form of normativity based on the emotions that 
constitute group identity. 
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In reality, of course, there was no such static "stage." Nor is there any 
sharp divide between pre-linguistic and linguistic hominins. What I am offering 
is a kind of snapshot of a continuous ongoing process, a snapshot that will 
reduce the leaps the imagination must take to make more comprehensible the 
passage from pre-human primates to contemporary, norm-governed selves.
 
2.   Cooperation
One of the most distinctive features of human evolution is the progressive 
development of cooperation. Cooperation typically involves a division of skilled 
labour. The very successful evolutionary strategy that hominins adopted 
involved the outsourcing of many of the individual's biological and social needs 
to others. Hunting large animals with primitive techniques required that one 
trust others to play their roles. Fires for cooking had to be kept burning while 
others were away gathering or hunting. Making stone tools was a specialized 
skill that few individuals could possess. The tribe's children had to be protected
from predators. Resources had to be protected from marauders from other 
tribes. Such cooperation beyond immediate family groups almost certainly 
existed by the time of Homo erectus. Acheulean stone axes, for instance, date 
from 1.76 million years ago and the skill was still being inherited with only 
minor changes 1.5 million years later. Yet it is highly unlikely that language as 
we know it developed until much later, possibly as late as Homo sapiens 
300,000 years ago. Hence, it is very likely that there was cooperation beyond 
immediate family groups before the arrival of language. 
The development of cooperation, however, runs up against a logical 
argument: even if a cooperative group of organisms were to be formed, 
individuals within it who took advantage of group resources without 
contributing -- free-riders -- would have a reproductive advantage, so over a 
period of generations non-cooperators would predominate and the cooperative 
group would break up. In the face of this theoretical argument, we need to 
account for how hominins governed by cooperative norms did, as a matter of 
empirical fact, evolve and form stable communities
Let me start by rejecting a Hobbesian account. For Hobbes, prior to the 
formation of society, humans lived as individuals in the "state of nature," where
each competed with each other, often violently, for resources.3 Since it was to 
their rational advantage to overcome this “state of war,” people decided to 
cede power to a sovereign who would establish and maintain a social order 
within which competition could be restrained and social cooperation enforced. 
Social order requires a contract between individuals each pursuing their own 
best interests.
The Hobbesian notion of cooperation by contract presupposes that, in the 
state of nature, there are already selves equipped with language who can 
rationally evaluate the advantages of cooperation and contract with others by 
responsibly binding themselves to certain norms of behaviour.4 Since my 
project is to trace the origin of such normative selves, Hobbes' approach is 
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circular for it starts off with the kind of self that only comes into being, I claim, 
at the end of the story.5 
The Kantian notion of normative selfhood runs up against the same 
difficulty. For Kant, "obeying a rule" -- his language for following norms -- is an 
autonomous activity: only if a person knows what the rules are and freely 
chooses to act on the basis of this knowledge can they be said to be following 
rules. Planets move in a way that can be described by rules, but they are not 
obeying these rules, for they have no knowledge of them.6 People may act out 
of instinct, habit, desire, or emotion, in a way that can be described by rules  
but in these cases they are no more "obeying rules" than planets are. 
For my thought-experiment to be plausible, however, we must be careful 
not to attribute to proto-selves those very characteristics of Modern, 
Enlightenment selves -- autonomy, rationality, responsibility and self-
consciousness -- whose origin the account is attempting to explain. The 
capacity to follow the communal norms that enabled early human cooperation 
cannot be understood as the following of explicit rules in this Kantian manner. 
More recently, Tomasello has presented evidence that chimps, and so 
presumably their common ancestor with hominins, lacked cooperative norms, 
despite their intelligence. He hypothesizes an intermediate evolutionary stage 
-- "joint intentionality" -- that is pre-linguistic, in which pairs of individual “early 
humans” learned to cooperate in joint practical projects.7 In his scenario, each 
individual saw that the joint project -- such as hunting a gazelle -- required 
different roles for each member of the pair and each communicated by gesture
and pantomime to help the other to accomplish her role. He speculates that 
this joint stage occurred with the arrival of Homo heidelbergensis, the common 
ancestor of Neanderthals and Homo sapiens, about 400,000 years ago. 
While Tomasello's approach is much more realistic than that of Hobbes or 
Kant, he shares two presuppositions with them. First, all three take an 
intellectualist stance: thought comes first; community comes second.  
Rationality is the basis for cooperation: only autonomous selves can 
deliberately weigh the various factors, obey the rules (Kant), contract with 
other (Hobbes), or deliberately adopt a joint project (Tomasello). In rejecting 
this intellectualism, I am proposing that such autonomy is a product of social 
cooperation, not a presupposition for it. I argue that emotion, not intellect, is 
the foundation for early human cooperation.
Their second presupposition is individualism: these accounts take the 
perspective of an individual. Hobbes and Tomasello phrase the cooperation 
problem as how individuals gain or lose by the strategy. But this is the wrong 
place to start. Even if genetic mutations in individual organisms can adequately
explain the evolution of other animal species -- which I doubt -- the uniquely 
cultural evolution of humans is a group phenomenon. We should contrast 
human systems of cooperation not with isolated competing individuals, but 
with pre-human biological systems. Chimps and, presumably, our common 
ancestors with them, already lived in bands. Individualism imagines proto-
selves as preformed and independent selves -- Hobbesian or Kantian rational 
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subjects -- thinking about the advantages of joining together. A better picture is
that of primate bands held together by instinct evolving into human 
communities held together by culture. 
3.   Group Identity
Tomasello hypothesizes that there is a second evolutionary watershed -- 
“collective intentionality" -- which arrived with Homo sapiens -- "modern 
humans” -- about 200,000 years ago and enabled groups to be as large as 150.
Unlike the prior stage of “joint intentionality” that involved individuals pairing 
up with particular partners for ad hoc projects, collective intentionality was less
individualistic, for it established conventional, cultural norms for “how things 
should be done” by everyone in the group. Cooperation in these collectives was
achieved by group identification. Each individual identified with the group and 
identified other members as "one of us." Those who follow "our" way of life are 
members of "our" community; they share our cultural norms, our projects, our 
beliefs, our values and our practices. An individual who does not do things our 
way is not "one of us;" they cannot be counted on. Thus, evolutionary selection
weeded out non-cooperators within the group, and constituted the group as 
itself a unit of evolutionary selection in competition with other human groups. 
This in-group/out-group attitude, claims Tomasello, is unique to Homo sapiens 
and is not to be found among the other apes.8 Cultural norms originated in the 
group; group members felt obliged to obey them; and people could assume 
that everyone else in the group would also follow them, even those they had 
not previously met or worked with in joint projects. 
Tomasello's claim for the importance of group identity is, I think, correct, 
but his intellectualist presupposition leads him to assume that such 
cooperating groups could have established cultural norms only by the use of 
language.9 Since I think that language arrives later than the formation of 
cooperating groups, my conjecture is that such communal identity could have 
been based on emotional relationships without the need for language. Group 
identity should initially be understood as a way of organizing emotional 
responses and only secondarily of structuring the mind and its thinking. 
Consider a contemporary team sport, such as soccer or hockey. A team 
scores and the fans stand and cheer. The fans act spontaneously, not 
deliberatively. They are not thinking of some obligation of group membership, 
rationally deciding that cheering is the right thing to do or following some rule 
that tells them how to behave. They are just imitating the others because "this 
is who we are -- we are Manchester United supporters." They are expressing 
their solidarity with their team: what it is to be a team fan is, among other 
things, to dress like one, to wave banners, to stand and cheer. They are 
conforming to the expectations of the group. Imagine a person in the group 
who doesn't stand: the fans expect her to stand and cheer; they are perplexed 
and distressed that she does not. She provokes puzzlement, a sense of 
impropriety, possibly anger, maybe a desire to exclude her -- she'd better sit 
some place else! Organizers place fans of opposing teams in different sections 
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to avoid such potential violence. Yet none of this is based on autonomous 
reasoning or explicit, linguistic norms. Team spirit is an emotional 
phenomenon, not a contractual, intellectual, rational one.
I offer such team spirit as an analogy for the emotional group identity that 
established norms for proto-selves. This analogy, of course, has a serious limit: 
while modern fans may check their autonomy at the door and act exclusively 
as part of the group, they do have another life outside of the game. If things 
get too out of hand, other norms of conduct, criminal law for instance, may cut 
in and subdue the enthusiasm. What I am proposing is a proto-human mode of 
group bonding that was exclusively this kind of team culture, without outside 
laws, without autonomous selves. Such emotional group identity, I am 
conjecturing, could account for the evolution of the norms needed for early 
human tribal cooperation without smuggling in the notion of a rational self. 
4.   Emotions
How could such emotional identification have come into being? The 
Modern intellectualist understanding of selfhood often relegates emotion to 
some instinctive, fleeting and primitive physiological process within individuals,
that is, to a disruptive animal mechanism that undermines the freedom of the 
autonomous self and interferes with rational normativity. To understand the 
role emotion may have played in the evolution of proto-selves, we need an 
alternative, more positive, and better defined account of emotion as enduring, 
culturally learned, communal and intentional. I will elaborate on each of these 
features in turn.
"Emotion" sometimes refers to a fleeting feeling, as when the media refers
to someone who weeps as "becoming emotional." Goldie rejects this sense and
offers instead a notion of emotion as an enduring episodic state.10 It is in 
Goldie's sense that I am claiming group identity is emotional: just as a fan's 
identification with her team lasts for years, though it may only be expressed 
episodically during games, a proto-self's identification with her tribe was a life-
long state, though it manifested itself in the ways she hunted with others, 
respected elders or danced to drum-beats, ways which were distinctive of her 
culture.
Emotions, or at least some of them, are culturally learned. All animals 
have instinctive, genetically programmed emotional reactions to the world -- 
primary emotions: they fear predators, get excited by prey, are aroused by 
sexual opportunities, and so on. The distinctive feature of the human way of 
life, however, is that it goes beyond genetic programming and depends on 
learned behaviour that is passed on from generation to generation. Biologically
based emotions continue to exist, but cultural tradition patterns their 
expression. Incest taboos, for instance, may restrict biologically based feelings 
of sexual attraction to non-relatives. A culture may also innovate and create 
new, non-instinctive emotions -- secondary emotions -- such as pride in the 
achievements of other group members. While all emotions involve bodily 
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processes, it is the learned – as opposed to innate – patterning of the emotions 
that creates group identity. 
Emotions, in so far as they are socially learned, are not purely individual 
phenomena. Some emotions, such as hostility to a foreign tribe, may be shared
simultaneously by many members of the society. However, even emotions 
expressed by a proto-self who happens to be alone may have a communal 
basis. A tribe member who feels protective towards a crying child of another 
member is expressing an emotion that is social in the sense that it is culturally 
patterned, even though it may not be shared by anyone else at that particular 
moment.
Emotions are not learned by instruction, at least not in the pre-linguistic 
stage I am conjecturing. Emotions are picked up by contagion and imitation. 
When a mother startles and becomes afraid at the sight of a snake, the baby in
her arms will come to share the fear, probably even before seeing the snake.11 
A child may come to feel safe and comfortable in a cave because her family 
group or tribe exhibits these emotions when they gather in the cave. When it is
time to go hunting, the project is not discussed, not even by gesture or 
pantomime. Rather, one hunter gets restless, the excitement spreads to others
by contagion, tensions rise and soon a party moves together with a common 
purpose. Such contagion may be due to mirror neurons, to scent-signalling, or 
other processes, but whatever the mechanism, individuals come to regularly 
undergo the same emotions as their group members without the need for 
language-based instruction. 
Emotions are intentional. The Enlightenment concept of selfhood tends to 
relegate emotions to pure physiology and so paints them as meaningless 
mechanisms. Yet even for animals, emotions are intentional states, that is, 
they are about objects and have a functional meaning.12 When a gazelle is 
fearful of a lion that fear is intentional in that it is about something, namely the
lion: it reveals the lion as a dangerous object. In this sense, an emotion can be 
said to be "fitting" when it is appropriate to its object or to the situation.13 A 
wolf with rabies may be angry with other animals and attack them in an 
indiscriminate and dysfunctional manner. We can label such anger 
"inappropriate" in contrast to the anger of a healthy wolf that is aggressive 
only for food or defence. 
Culturally patterned emotions elaborate this biological intentionality. The 
learned, encultured feeling of security in a cave is about an object, the cave.14 
Assuming caves really are safe places for the tribe, an individual who is afraid 
of the cave is in error: her emotion is inappropriate. It is the intentionality of 
emotions that gives them their bivalence, their capacity to be correct or 
incorrect, and that enables emotions to establish norms, as we shall see below.
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5.   The Evolution of Group Identity
With this understanding of the nature of emotions, cooperation between 
proto-selves could plausibly have been based on emotional group identity 
before the development of language, of contracts, or of explicit rules. The 
theoretically disruptive effects of free-riders acting solely in their own interests 
was not overcome by considerations of reason but by the formation of social 
bonds based on culturally patterned emotions. Yet we still need to ask how, 
even without reliance on language, such a group identity could have evolved 
and have been preserved in the face of such divisive individual competition.
Dunbar suggests a solution. He notes that apes who regularly groom each 
other form an emotional bond -- possibly because of the release of endorphins 
-- and are more likely to cooperate with each other in other activities.15 
Grooming, however, is time-consuming and the time needed increases with the
size of the group. As hominin groups became larger, the task of keeping track 
of relations between individuals required more neural resources. 
Australopithecines, with a brain size of 480 cc, lived in groups of about 50. 
Homo erectus, with twice that brain size, could relate to 100 people. Early 
Homo sapiens lived in tribes of about 150 and had a brain volume of about 
1250 cc.16  According to Dunbar's "social brain" hypothesis, the larger brain 
volume was not needed for using tools, but for maintaining cooperative social 
relations. Since larger brains consumed much energy, however, more time had 
to be spent on food gathering, so as group size increased the time available for
grooming was reduced rather than increased. Dunbar calculates the time-
budgeting involved and concludes that alternative means of social bonding 
other than grooming would have had to be found if such larger hominin groups 
were to be held together. 
Dunbar discusses a number of alternative means of bonding, such as 
laughter and religion. I will focus on music and dance to illustrate how even 
without language group identity could have evolved beyond grooming. Dunbar 
hypothesizes that communal dancing and music developed as early as Homo 
erectus as one technique for bonding in larger groups.17  A possible objection 
comes from theorists who claim that music that is based on relative pitch – 
melody -- depends on, and therefore appears after, language.18 However, music
in the sense of rhythm, such as a drum-beat, is universal among contemporary 
humans, so it may have an early, genetic basis. Among primates, it is unique to
humans, so it may have evolved early enough to contribute to group identity.19 
Direct evidence for this speculation is hard to find. Indirect evidence, 
however, comes from Dunbar's psychological investigations which show that 
making music together releases endorphins in modern humans and that the 
endorphin release enhances social cooperation.20 (Other research suggests that
oxytocin is involved.) Other studies find that most people use music to induce 
emotions. Pre-linguistic infants pay rapt attention to songs, regardless of the 
linguistic content or the identity of the person singing.21 Some contemporary 
hunting and gathering cultures engage in rituals that involve drumming and 
dance with strong emotional elements. Music is almost invariably associated 
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with clan gathering or national celebrations. There is evidence that 
contemporary adults who actively make music together and move in synchrony
are more likely to cooperate on other tasks.22  Sports teams and religious 
groups typically rely on music to incite a sense of unity. While all this research 
is based on modern humans, the universal presence of music among humans 
suggests that the capacity is long-standing. Hence, human musicality, at least 
in the restricted sense of rhythm, may well have been one way of replacing 
primate grooming as a tactic for inculcating the emotions needed to bind large 
cooperative groups of proto-selves.
Musicality, of course, is not likely to have been the sole source of 
communal emotions. My conjecture is that early proto-human societies came 
about by small tribal groups of hominins developing culturally patterned 
emotions through festivals of rhythm and dance, shamanistic religious-like 
rituals, totemic symbols and other techniques. Isolating musicality as a 
separate element from these other activities is a contemporary conceptual 
abstraction. What I'm claiming is that it is the ensemble of these kinds of 
activities that generated the group identification needed to overcome the 
dispersive forces of competition and that created proto-selves governed by 
communal emotional norms. 
6.   Normativity
My central claim in this paper is that such emotional group identity, 
however it evolved, constituted proto-selves as normative creatures. Each 
culture established patterns of behaviour that every group member should 
follow. These emotional norms were maintained and enforced by the 
community. Those who didn't, or couldn't, follow the appropriate norms were 
not identified as group members: they were not "one of us." They could not be 
counted on to share the dangers of the hunt, or to protect the group's children.
If emotional expressions of disgust or rejection were not enough to enforce 
these norms, other community members would punish the non-conformers, 
exclude them from joint enterprises, or ultimately exile or kill them. While 
communities varied in how they handled the problem, every culture had to find
some strategy for enforcing its norms and maintaining the unity of its pattern.
It is crucial that we not misinterpret this emotional stage in an 
intellectualist fashion. Fully fledged selves may voluntarily follow rules that 
they are consciously aware of, in the way that Kant conceives of obeying 
obligatory duty, but following an emotional norm is not a matter of explicit 
choice in this way. Recall my analogy with soccer fans: they express 
excitement at the appropriate moments by contagion from the emotion of 
other fans. This is not like an autonomous self who might objectively perceive a
situation and then deliberately evaluate it normatively. Such an is-ought gap is 
an artifact of rational selfhood; it assumes that first there is knowledge of facts 
and only secondarily -- and problematically – there is evaluation of these facts 
on the basis of desires, or of cognitive or moral norms. If we are to avoid 
parachuting the concept of a fully developed self back into evolution in an 
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anachronistic manner, we must avoid such a dichotomy. For proto-selves there 
was no is-ought gap. Snakes were felt to be dangerous, a mammoth was 
fearsome, eating the flesh of a fellow tribesmember was disgusting, incest 
taboos resulted in the absence of sexual attraction, a female in estrus was 
sexually attractive to a male. The world in which proto-selves lived was 
constituted not of neutral, scientific objects and facts, but of entities laden with
emotional value, with inclinations to actions.
It is the intentionality of emotion that determines this normativity. The 
directedness of an emotion to an object in the world means that it is the object 
that sets the standard for the emotion's appropriateness or inappropriateness. 
Emotional intentionality has a triangular structure: first, there are the 
communal norms enforced by the culture on each proto-self; second, there is 
the learned emotional pattern that makes up a proto-self; and third there is the
world of objects with their significances and values to which the proto-self 
thereby gets access. To live in a cultural world is to perceive objects, actions 
and others as having cultural meanings: each individual embodies the norms of
the culture. An individual may have learned from their tradition, for instance, 
that snakes are to-be-feared. This doesn't mean they first recognize a snake 
and secondarily apply the norm "to-be-avoided" to it. More likely, a rustling in 
the leaves is felt to be dangerous, to be escaped from, and only within such a 
fearful feeling does the situation crystallize into a snake. Cultural norms, the 
emotional structure of proto-selves, and the world of entities with meaning, are
three sides of the same coin.
This is also true of how individuals in the cultural world are perceived. 
Some are seen as to-be-followed, others to-be-cooperated with. Children are to-
be-protected, non-cooperators are to-be-shunned. Similarly, actions in the 
cultural repertoire are not just events that objectively happen; they are things-
we-do, or things-we-don't-do, and so on. Food gathering is to be cooperated 
with; fighting foreigners "comes naturally," that is, it is the culturally expected 
behaviour. During a ritual, the drum-beat automatically engages the feet in 
dancing, without reflection.
In learning to respond in the manner patterned by their tradition, 
individuals become subject to the cultural norms of appropriate or 
inappropriate emotions. It is the emotions involved in group identity that 
constitute proto-selves as normative creatures. At this evolutionary stage we 
have individuals who during childhood have learned more or less successfully a
pattern of behaviour and who, as adults, have that pattern reinforced by 
coordinated interactions with others. This is just a matter of conformity not of 
freedom. Appropriate cultural behaviour is not an add-on, imposed on or 
voluntarily accepted by the group member. What the individual is is a 
biological organism whose behaviour -- including brain, hormonal and 
emotional behaviour -- conforms to the patterns of the culture. Group identity 
determines the very being of the tribesmember in the first place. While their 
normativity is not that of autonomous selves, it is, in retrospect, an 
intermediate evolutionary stage from which modern selves can develop. 
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7.   Conclusion: Modern selves
Modern selfhood presents itself as autonomous and rational, obeying 
cognitive, moral and linguistic norms on the basis of clear, conscious principles.
My evolutionary just-so story suggests a way that such normativity can evolve 
gradually and historically. Yet my account is not of purely historical interest. 
Modern selves mature from children who relate to their parents and 
communities emotionally and, in a sense, recapitulate the evolutionary history. 
Even when we are adults, the explicit norms we follow are rooted in the social 
order with which we emotionally identify. This is particularly obvious in the 
case of language: I follow the norms of English because I am an Anglophone. I 
did not choose to be an Anglophone. I inherited this identity from my parents 
and their community. Similarly, some follow religious norms, yet in only rare 
cases is their membership in a religious community a matter of explicit choice.
My story suggests - though I cannot pursue the issue here -- that, in 
opposition to the traditional view, emotionality should not be seen as a falling 
away from ideal rational behaviour, even for modern selves. Rather, emotional 
identity is the basis for the norms we bind ourselves to as autonomous selves. 
It is our national, historical, ethnic, linguistic, gender and religious identities 
that make us into -- and sustain us as -- normative creatures. Instead of the 
Cartesian picture of the self as a pure spiritual entity, beyond language, body 
and culture, we should conceptualize the autonomous self as embedded in a 
community whose emotional identification is the inescapable basis for its 
normativity, both in its evolutionary history and in its present existence.
David L. Thompson
Memorial University of Newfoundland
                                                                                                           2016
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Endnotes
1 “I think that philosophy is the study of us as creatures who judge and 
act, that is, as discursive, concept-using creatures. And I think that Kant 
is right to emphasize that understanding what we do in these terms is 
attributing to us various kinds of normative status, taking us to be 
subject to distinctive sorts of normative appraisal. So a central 
philosophical task is understanding this fundamental normative 
dimension within which we dwell. Kant’s own approach to this issue, 
developing themes from Rousseau, is based on the thought that 
genuinely normative authority (constraint by norms) is distinguished 
from causal power (constraint by facts) in that it binds only those who 
acknowledge it as binding. Because one is subject only to that authority 
one subjects oneself to, the normative realm can be understood equally 
as the realm of freedom. So being constrained by norms is not only 
compatible with freedom—properly understood, it can be seen to be 
what freedom consists in. I don’t know of a thought that is deeper, more 
difficult, or more important than this.” (Brandom 116-117)
2 “[A]uthority, responsibility, and commitment were not features of the 
non- or pre-human world. They did not exist until human beings started 
taking or treating each other as authoritative, responsible, committed, 
and so on—that is, until they started adopting normative attitudes 
towards one another.” (Brandom  69) 
3 “Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man 
is enemy to every man, the same consequent to the time wherein men 
live without other security than what their own strength and their own 
invention shall furnish them withal. ... and the life of man, solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short.” (Hobbes  Ch XIII)
4 “But the most noble and profitable invention of all other was that of 
speech, consisting of names or appellations, and their connexion; 
whereby men register their thoughts, recall them when they are past, 
and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation;
without which there had been amongst men neither Commonwealth, nor 
society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears, and 
wolves. The first author of speech was God himself ...” (Hobbes Ch IV)
5 “To make covenants with brute beasts is impossible, because not
understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any 
translation of right, nor can translate any right to another: and without 
mutual acceptation, there is no covenant. ... The matter or subject of a 
covenant is always something that falleth under deliberation, for to 
covenant is an act of the will; that is to say, an act, and the last act, of 
deliberation;”  (Hobbes  Ch XIV) 
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